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W hen Rights Collide: Free Speech, Corporations, and Moral Rights
I. Introduction
Corporations use their claimed right to free speech for significant effect upon the 
world. This paper examines what happens when that claim, as embodied in U.S. legal 
doctrine, collides with the rights of natural persons. I begin by briefly reviewing U.S. case 
law that both protects commercial speech and prohibits governmentally coerced speech. I 
then examine how these two doctrines were conflated by the U.S. Supreme Court (“Court”) 
to create opportunities for competing claims of free speech rights by natural persons and by 
corporations. I use the case of International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy* 
(“International Dairy”) to illustrate one such collision. I then propose a desired normative 
outcome for that case and the conflict it represents, and investigate two theories for arriving 
at it. I conclude that it is unethical for natural persons — singly, or through associations — to 
grant legal rights to corporations. Rather, natural persons, through their representative 
governments, should grant legal protections and powers to corporations only as conditional 
privileges.
Corporate power substantially shapes U.S. public policy on issues from 
transportation, energy, taxes and military action, to education, the environment and 
healthcare. Policy implementation has become big business as well, as national, state, and 
local governments outsource traditional governmental roles to corporations (e.g., 
management of prisons, public schools, and welfare rolls). Now, under the guise of
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‘privatization,’ the free trade regime promotes privatization worldwide, which is to say it 
promotes the displacement of transparent governments with opaque ‘private’ corporations/ 
The acquisition of legal rights by the corporate form made their influence upon 
public affairs both feasible and formidable. From the perspective of wealthy industrialists 
this was a necessary progression, tracking wealth from its association with natural persons 
through the mid-nineteenth century to its subsequent reconstitution in the corporate form, 
specifically, the limited liability corporation. This progression made it necessary that those 
rights which served to protect and project the wealth of natural persons should then be 
awarded to the corporate form. In the U.S. it was the Court that made the award and with it 
the legal hasis for the collision of rights between natural persons and corporations. ’
European history in the future United States begins with the corporate globalization 
of the New World by the English King’s crown corporations which literally governed the
' International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d. Cir 1996).
■ The opacity comes from the cataract of contracts that do not obligate transparency, that 
declare some information as private, or through various legal precedents that some corporate 
information is by default private or protected as trade secret, etc.
’ There exists a very rich history on the foundation for this “necessary progression,” 
particularly the tensions between business interests and state governments, and the tension 
within state governments to either tame or expand private economic power. One could look 
at the rising economic power of the textile industry in the early nineteenth century and its 
influence on imminent domain law, general incorporation law, and grants of limited liability 
(see Horwitz, Morton J. (1977) The Transformation o f American Law, 1780-1860, 
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, especially pp. 47-56). One could look also at the 
railroad industry’s increasing economic might following the Civil War, and its lawyers’ 
successful battle for corporate personhood (see Horwitz, Morton J. (1992) The 
Transformation o f American Law, 1870-1960 : The Crisis o f Legal Orthodoxy, New York NY, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 65-107). For reasons of brevity I only mention this history and 
suggest readers look at the numerous excellent works on this subject.
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colonies. The American Revolution is, then, accurately portrayed as a revolution against 
corporate rule. W ith these events fresh in colonists’ minds, the newly united states carefully 
circumscribed the authority of corporations, granting corporate charters primarily to 
promote the public good."* This subservience all but disappeared in practice and nearly so in 
law by the acquisition o f ‘rights’ by corporations. U.S. courts now consider corporate rights 
to be equally legitimate to those associated with natural persons, delivering equal legal status 
to the rights o f natural persons and to the corporations that natural persons create; just as the 
court appears blind to a person’s race or gender in recognizing their legal rights, it is also 
blind to whether the person is natural or artificial, that is, a human being or a corporation.
As a consequence, U.S. citizens’ efforts to exert democratic authority upon corporations are 
often blocked by U.S. courts that protect and historically have expanded the kind and scope 
of rights claimed by corporations.
II. D istinguishing Legal and M oral Rights
It is important to distinguish between legal rights and moral ones, and their
respective relationships to a nation’s constitution (for those nations that have them). In his 
essay “Taking Rights Seriously” philosopher Ronald Dworkin considers some of the rights 
declared in the U.S. Constitution to be moral rights. He notes specifically the right o f free
M uch of the literature detailing these controls is presented in histories o f the limited 
liability corporation; see Dodd, Edwin Merrick (1954) American Business Corporations until 
1860 : With Special Reference to Massachusetts, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press; 
Blumberg, Phillip I. (1986) ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’, o f Corporate 
Law, Vol. 11, pp. 573-631; and Wood, Gordon S. (1991) The Radicalism o f the American 
Revolution, New York NY, Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 318-22.
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speech, embodied in that Constitution’s First Amendment, to illustrate his ideas.’ Legal 
rights, on the other hand, are established by law, and these may or may not overlap with 
moral rights. For example, the Government may have a traffic law granting drivers the right 
to make a curbside turn from a curbside lane after stopping at a red traffic light. It is a 
liberty granted by law, and is easily revoked by the passage of another law. The revocation of 
such legal rights may be justified "if the proper officials believe, on sound evidence, that the 
gain to the many will outweigh the inconvenience to the few.’"’
Moral rights, to contrast, exist outside the law and are crucially characterized as those 
rights which people have against, and thus independent of, any government.^ It does not 
matter how inconvenient moral rights are to other people or to a government; they remain 
sacrosanct.^ Another important characteristic o f moral rights is the popular consensus that 
attaches them to natural persons. The universal recognition of human dignity finds 
expression in this attachment. There is no parallel consensus for corporations, no expression
’ The First Amendment in its entirety reads “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or o f the press; or the right o f the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” The legal interpretation of the general prohibition 
on governmental restriction of speech is itself dynamic, under seemingly constant refinement 
by U.S. courts.
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) ‘Taking Rights Seriously’, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, p. 191.
 ̂ Dworkin p. 184.
® For example, a society that takes seriously the right to free speech assumes that some of its 
members will have to hear speech that they find offensive: “we are often ‘captives’ outside 
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech” (Cohen v. California (1971)
403 U.S. 15, p. 21).
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o f hum an dignity in seeing these rights as associated with the corporate form, and there are 
good reasons why we do not — and should not — find such a parallel consensus.
Lastly, governments are slow to recognize moral rights as legal ones either by statute 
or in their constitutions.^ But once recognized it is illegitimate for a government to revoke 
them — even if its citizens appear to voluntarily demand this.*® Some moral rights are 
essential prerequisites for self-governance. Again, free speech without fear of governmental 
retribution provides our example. The rights that make democracy legitimate cannot be 
revoked without destroying democracy — another reason for the sanctity that should be 
accorded moral rights. To insure democracy it is crucial that in collisions between moral 
rights and those that are merely legal ones, it is the merely legal ones that are subject to 
change. Taking rights seriously means honoring the inalienable and irrevocable properties of 
moral rights.
III. T he Foundation for Conflicting Claims to Free Speech Rights
Some foundation must be laid before getting to the example o f a collision of claims
over the moral right o f free speech between natural persons and corporations. This 
foundation includes the U.S. Supreme Court rationale firmly establishing First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech, and the rationale prohibiting governmentally coerced 
speech. Lastly, I briefly cover how these two doctrines were conflated by the U.S. Supreme
® The 1948 adoption by the United Nations of a “Universal Declaration of Hum an Rights’ 
is one starting place for investigating specific assertions o f moral rights and the consequent 
effort to legalize them. Available at h ttp ://www.un .org/Overview/rights.html.
*® Dworkin p. 191.
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C ourt to  create opportunities for these collisions, m aking possible such cases as International 
D airy .
U .S. legal doctrine currently relies upon the rights o f those w ho hear commercial 
speech in order to justify protection for that k ind o f speech. T he case o f  particular interest, 
V irginia Pharm acy Board v. V irginia C onsum er C ouncil (“V irginia Pharm acy”) ,“  dealt w ith 
a challenge to a state law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the prices they or their 
com petitors charge for prescription m edications. T he speech in question, the C ourt 
declared, clearly is commercial speech, thus the C ourt did no t grapple w ith the larger 
question o f  where the boundary lies between clearly commercial and clearly protected 
speech.'^ Instead, the court narrowly focused on “w hether or no t this com m unication is 
wholly outside the protection o f  the First A m e n d m e n t . T h e  Virginia Pharmacy C ourt 
decided th a t First A m endm ent protections do extend to purely commercial speech, resting its 
rationale for such protections prim arily upon the free speech rights o f  the information 
recipients, and to a m uch lesser degree on the rights o f  the speaker or on the con ten t o f the
com m unication.
"  V irginia Pharm acy Board y. Virginia C onsum er C ouncil (1976) 425 U.S. 748.
V irginia Pharm acy p. 761.
V irginia Pharm acy p. 761.
T here is no  inherent free speech right to engage in the activities o f  deliberately inaccurate 
‘factual’ inform ation, or commercial speech that is misleading, attem pts to deceive, or 
prom otes an illegal product or enterprise.
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Previous Supreme Court decisions had recognized the “right to ‘receive information 
and ideas,’ and that the freedom o f speech ‘necessarily protects the right to receive.”” ’ The 
Virginia Pharmacy Court acknowledged and extended that accepted doctrine to include 
purely commercial speech, since “[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest 
in the day’s most urgent political debate.” *̂’ In other words, who is to say that purely 
commercial information is not o f similar significance — to the hearer — than is political 
information, and thus worthy o f similar respect as demonstrated by acknowledging the 
hearer's First Amendment right to receive the information.'^ The Virginia Pharmacy Court 
writes, “It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers o f suppressing information, 
and the dangers o f its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for 
us,”'® which is to err on protecting the recipients’ right to receive it — not paternally protect 
them from it. The Virginia Pharmacy decision firmly established commercial speech as 
being o f value in the “marketplace of ideas, ” indeed that the purpose for protecting purely 
commercial speech is to assist populating that marketplace because recipients have a right to 
receive that inform ation.'’
Virginia Pharmacy p. 757. 
Virginia Pharmacy p. 763.
The U.S. Supreme Court has always granted greater First Amendment protections to 
political speech than to commercial speech.
'® Virginia Pharmacy p. 770.
'’ The Court later consolidated and elaborated in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission (1980) 447 U.S. 557 on the question of when the government may 
constitutionally infringe upon commercial speech. Infringement depends upon satisfying all
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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D issenting Justice R ehnquist leveled m uch criticism  against the m ajority decision, 
and  one p o in t is particularly w orth  noting, that is, a person’s desire to know  does no t justify 
th a t the desired com m unication be thus protected by the First A m endm ent/"  For him , the 
class o f  bo th  the con ten t o f  the speech and the nature o f  the speaker influences the 
recognition o f  protected speech, particularly and uncontrovertibly, that the First 
A m endm ent serves to protect political speech and natural persons speaking and hearing that 
speech. W e shall later return  to these ideas.
T h e  doctrines associated w ith  governm entally coerced speech provides an interesting 
contrast w ith  free speech doctrine. T he two circumstances o f  particular interest are, firstly, 
w hen the governm ent compels a person to express speech that violates their conscience, and 
secondly, w hen property is com m andeered to provide for the speech o f  non-property  owners. 
Regarding the former, the U.S. legal doctrine restricts the governm ent from com pelling a 
person to m ake an expression that violates their conscience; e.g., forcing a person to salute 
the flag.^' Simply, the C o u rt has held that the state is no t allowed to coerce a person to
four parts o f  the C entral H udson  test: (1) the speech is no t false, deceptive or o f  illegal 
activities; (2) there is a substantial governm ental interest in the speech; (3) the law directly 
advances the governm ent’s interest; and (4) the law is no m ore extensive than necessary in 
order to  satisfy the governm ent’s interest.
V irginia Pharm acy p. 787. “I t is undoubtedly  arguable that m any people in the country 
regard the choice o f  sham poo as just as im portan t as w ho may be elected to ... political 
office, b u t that does no t autom atically bring inform ation about com peting sham poos w ithin 
the p ro tection  o f  the First A m endm ent. ”
W est V irginia State Board o f  Educations v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624
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express prescribed speech that violates their conscience. Similarly, the government may not 
punish a person for obscuring a governmental slogan that appears on their license plate.'"
In Wooley v. Maynard (“Wooley”), a husband and wife were repeatedly arrested for 
obscuring the motto “Live Free or Die” that appeared on the noncommercial automobile 
license plates in their state o f residence. Mr. Maynard, the husband, in explaining his action 
commented, “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find 
morally, ethically, religiously and politically a b h o r r e n t . T h e  U.S. Supreme Court found 
in favor o f Mr. Maynard, ruling that the state o f New Hampshire unconstitutionally violated 
his conscience when they commandeered his property for the purpose o f expressing state- 
sanctioned speech. It is not merely Mr. Maynard’s abhorrence of the speech that is at issue, 
it is also the use of his property to ‘speak’ it that distinguishes the case.^  ̂ The Wooley Court 
declared that the government may not “constitutionally require an individual to participate 
in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a 
manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public, adding that
Wooley V . Maynard (1977) 430 U.S. 705. 
W ooley p. 713.
The Court noted a third component that for reasons of simplification I relegate to this 
footnote. The third component is that property owners cannot reasonably distance 
themselves from being associating with that speech. It is a different issue and beyond the 
scope o f this article to argue whether or not the Court was correct to see the license plate as 
unavoidably associated with Mr. Woolsey, since that same plate appears not just on his car 
but on every noncommercial car licensed in that state. See Wooley p. 713 (Justice Rehnquist 
dissenting).
W ooley p. 713.
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the “right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept o f ‘individual freedom of mind.’”^̂
This case took the recognized limitations against governmentally coerced speech 
from the direct forced expression by individual persons themselves (e.g., saluting the flag) 
and extended these to include the property controlled by individuals. This extension of the 
coerced speech doctrine created an opening whereby corporations could make similar claims 
about coerced speech because, though corporations do not exist within a natural body that 
expressly ‘speaks,’ are themselves property that the government may demand be used to 
speak’ on the behalf of a third party. The Supreme Court subsequently delivered to 
property — in the corporate form — protections from governmentally coerced speech that the 
property owners find objectionable. This is the case o f Pacific Gas &C Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission (“Pacific Gas & Electric
Pacific Gas & Electric conflates the commercial speech doctrine as set out in Virginia 
Pharmacy with the coerced speech doctrine as set out in Wooley. Briefly, the circumstances 
o f Pacific Gas &C Electric involve a California Public Utility Commission order to the Pacific 
Gas Electric Company — a publicly regulated utility monopoly — to grant access to its 
utility billing envelopes for use by third parties. These third parties ostensibly represented 
the interests o f the ratepayers (i.e., customers o f the utility) and would only get access upon a 
grant by the Public Utilities Commission. In Pacific Gas &C Electric, the Court decided in
W ooley p. 714.
Pacific Gas &C Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1986) 475 U.S. 1.
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favor o f  the utility corporation because it believed that the m andated access w ould have a 
chilling effect on the free speech rights o f  the corporation. H ypothetically speaking, the 
th ird -party  could express views that were contrary to the interests o f  the corporation, and the 
corporation w ould then be under pressure to respond w hen they w ould prefer to be silent on 
the m atter. “T his pressure to respond ‘is particularly apparent w hen the owner has taken a 
position opposed to the view being expressed on his property.’ [...] T h a t kind o f forced 
response is antithetical to the free discussion that the First A m endm ent seeks to foster.” ®̂
T h e Pacific Gas &  Electric C ourt first relies upon Virginia Pharmacy to affirm that 
purely com m ercial speech receives some First A m endm ent protections in order to better 
populate the m arketplace o f ideas. It then cites W ooley to conclude that First A m endm ent 
protections extend to the use o f one’s property when the property owner finds the coerced 
speech to be objectionable. This decision, paradoxically, limits the marketplace o f ideas.
T his paradox suggests that the rationale confirm ing First A m endm ent protections for 
com m ercial speech, as set ou t in V irginia Pharm acy, was ignored, and that only the doctrine 
— sanitized o f  its foundations — was applied. T he C ourt in Pacific Gas &C Electric conflates 
the two doctrines, concluding that a corporation can haye its artificial ‘conscience’ yiolated.
It then  m istakenly extends to  corporations w hat Justice Rehnquist calls a “negative free 
speech” right.^^
Pacific Gas Electric pp. 15-16.
Pacific Gas &C Electric p. 26 (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting).
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T his developm ent is a recipe for conflict, particularly a conflict between natural 
persons claiming a right to receive inform ation, and corporations claiming negative free 
speech rights. Pacific Gas &C Electric sets the stage for International Dairy Foods Association 
V . Am estoy, the U.S. case that illustrates a collision o f  moral rights.
IV. A  C o llis io n  o f  R ights
Both parties in International Dairy ’̂̂ made claims upon the First A m endm ent right 
to free speech found in the U.S. C onstitu tion (and taking D w orkin’s lead, I will assume free 
speech as a m oral right), thus International Dairy represents rivalrous claims upon a moral 
right. O n  one side is the claim o f negative free speech rights by the International Dairy 
Foods corporation. O n  the other side is the claim by natural persons to be well inform ed on 
bo th  commercial as well as political matters.
T he case revolves around a 1994 V erm ont state labeling law (“statute”) requiring that 
“ [i]f rBST has been used in the production o f milk or a m ilk product for retail sale in this 
state, the retail milk or milk product shall be labeled as such.” '̂ T he appellants, including 
the International Dairy Foods Association, claimed the statute violated their corporate 
claimed First A m endm ent rights o f  negative free speech, that is, they claimed the statute
30 W hat appears here are those points necessary for this article’s thesis. For a m ore derailed 
treatm ent o f this case, particularly the concept o f negative free speech, see the au thor’s article 
(2003) ‘W hen  Silence is no t G olden : Negative Free Speech and H um an Rights for 
C orporations’, JVew College o f  California Law Review, Vol. 4 N o. 1, pp. 87-96.
International Dairy p. 69, quoting Vt. Star, Ann. tit. 66, § 2754(c). Recom binant Bovine 
Som atotropin (“rBST”) is a synthetic growth horm one approved in 1993 by the U.S. Food 
and D rug A dm inistration for use in dairy cows producing m ilk for hum an consum ption 
(International Dairy p. 69).
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forced them  to use their property (i.e., their product packaging) to make a statem ent 
contrary to  their v i e w s . T h e  Second C ircuit C ourt o f  Appeals decided on behalf o f 
appellants, agreeing w ith their claim that the statute required them  to make an involuntary 
statem ent in violation o f their negative free speech rights.
T h e  court o f  appeals listed a sequence o f extant Supreme C ourt doctrines that lead 
this court to its conclusion, all o f  which were introduced above: commercial speech does 
receive First A m endm ent protections; protected types o f speech include facts as well as 
opinions;^^ “ [t]he right not to  speak inheres in political and commercial speech alike” and 
corporate as well as hum an speakers possess negative free speech rights. Com m ercial speech 
receives lesser C onstitutional protection than political speech, the state needing to prove only 
a substantial state interest to justify infringement.^^ T he court opined that the state failed to 
pass the test. Traversing this line o f  reasoning the court agreed w ith appellants that the
In ternational D airy p. 71.
T his already is im plied by Virginia Pharmacy, as the speech in question was that o f  
prescription drug prices -- purely factual inform ation.
In ternational Dairy p. 71.
U.S. courts use the judicially invented standard o f ‘strict scrutiny’ when the m ost crucial 
constitutional rights, such as the right to engage in political speech, appear to be infringed 
upon  by the legislation under review. Strict scrutiny consists o f  a two-prong test. First, the 
governm ent m ust prove a com pelling state interest is being served. The second prong o f the 
test asks w hether or no t the law in question is a “narrowly tailored means” for satisfying this 
com pelling state interest. Legislation is deemed unconstitutional if  it fails either part o f this 
test. ‘Interm ediate scrutiny’ is an easier test to pass. This interm ediate test is applied to 
com m ercial speech. U nder this test, the governm ent m ust only prove that a substantial state 
interest is at stake, and that the law materially advances that interest.
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statue “indisputably requires them  to speak when they would rather n o t” '̂̂  and thus violates 
their First A m endm ent rights.
T h e  question of, or rather the failure to recognize, a substantial state interest deserves 
some exam ination. Unlike food additives, rBST is not directly added to food, bu t rather 
adm inistered to dairy cows. After noting that it was “undisputed” that rBST produced no 
scientifically measurable effect upon the finished consumer product itself (i.e., the milk), the 
court stated that “ [w]e are aware o f no case in which consumer interest alone was sufficient 
to justify requiring a product’s manufacturers to publish the functional equivalent o f  a 
w arning about a production m ethod that has no discernable impact on a final product. 
V erm ont citizens may, o f  course, have been less convinced o f the long-term  safety o f  m ilk 
from  rSBT treated cows, or may have had other identifiable reasons for preferring milk 
produced w ithout rBST. ^  However, the court was convinced that “the state itself has not 
adopted the concerns o f the consumers; it has only adopted that the consumers are 
concerned. Unfortunately, here consum er concern is not, in itself, a substantial [state]
” 39interest.
^  International Dairy p. 72. 
International Dairy p. 73.
38 Cows treated w ith rBST produce m ore milk, but also suffer from increased risk for 
“clinical mastitis [udder infections] (visibly abnorm al milk), digestive disorders such as 
indigestion, bloat, and diarrhea, enlarged hocks and lesions, and swellings” (International 
D airy p. 69, bracketed material in original).
International Dairy p. 74, fn. 2. Judge Levai’s dissent did no t share this extremely narrow  
view o f  the “state interest” served by the labeling law, concluding, as a factual m atter, that 
the V erm ont state governm ent had indeed adopted (or at least deferred to) its citizens’
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ritz - 15
In ternational D airy decided that dairy producers are under no com pulsion to reveal 
its use, and com plem entarily, natural persons do no t have the right to know  where rBST is 
used. T h e  dispute in this case cannot be resolved through the marketplace, as consumers 
w ho are denied access to inform ation cannot possibly make decisions based on that decisive 
yet absent knowledge. Logically, one could claim that while consumers may not easily know 
w hich products were produced using rBST, perhaps they could know  who is not using it by 
voluntary negative-use claims made by other dairy product manufacturers. However this 
option  is no t available, as the M onsanto Com pany (the sole producer o f  rBST for the U.S. 
m arket) has successfully engaged in legal actions against dairy product manufacturers that 
make negative-use claims.^”
T h e paradox introduced in Pacific Gas & Electric is fully visible in International 
D airy and recognized by the dissenting justice. H e saw that the required disclosure 
statem ent dem anded o f  m ilk producers was not judgm ental, and thus speech that one could 
find as violating their conscience. Rather, it was factual inform ation — exactly the kind of 
inform ation that citizens have a right to request, and the governm ent has the ability to 
procure an answer.
substantial “health, econom ic, and ethical concerns” (International Dairy p. 76 (Justice 
Levai, dissenting)).
Aboulafia, David (1998) ‘Pushing rBST : H ow  the Law and the Political Process W ere 
U sed to Sell R ecom binant Bovine Som atotropin to America’, Pace University Law Review, 
Sum m er, Vol. 15, pp. 617-618. M onsanto  argues that claims o f  negative-use suggest that 
m ilk from  rBST treated cows is somehow dangerous.
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[T]he true objective of the milk producers is concealment. They do not wish 
consumers to know that their milk products were produced by use of rBST 
because there are consumers who, for various reasons, prefer to avoid rBST.
[...] In my view, the interest of the milk producers has little entitlement to 
protection under the First Amendment. The case law that has developed 
under the doctrine of commercial speech has repeatedly emphasized that the 
primary function of the First Amendment in its application to commercial 
speech is to advance truthful disclosure — the very interest that the milk 
producers seek to undermine.^*
One cannot both justify the protection of commercial speech based on a right to 
know and then use that protection to enable corporations to prevent that information’s 
disclosure. They cannot both hold true.
V. T he D esired Norm ative Arrangement
International Dairy set an important legal precedent in the U.S. for how to settle the 
competing free speech claims, particularly the conflict between claims to negative free speech 
and the right to be well informed. One expects the logic of this case to find its way into the 
international trade regime, whereby corporations claim that a nation’s labeling laws create 
unfair barriers to trade and thus are violations of NAFTA or W TO  agreements. But the 
heart of this case is not its issues of trade, and of human or even bovine health and safety. It
41 International Dairy p. 80 (Justice Levai, dissenting).
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is, rather, the collision o f rights between corporations and natural persons, and the contest to 
determ ine whose interests shall trium ph.
By fram ing this as a collision I assume that the interests o f  natural persons are in 
opposition to the interests o f  corporations and their owners and managers. Adm ittedly, 
these interests are no t always at odds. But such occasions o f agreement merely provide a 
necessary b u t insufficient condition for even considering the extension o f moral rights to 
corporations. Rather, we are concerned w ith the occasions o f disagreement. T he normative 
question is this: w hat resolution should we natural persons desire when these rights collide?
A t this po in t it is useful to note that corporations have been the recipients o f  many 
U.S. C onstitu tional rights. All o f them  were awarded to the corporate form by the judicial 
elaboration o f  the U.S. Supreme C ourt — not through the U.S. C onstitutional am endm ent 
process nor through the actions o f  elected representatives extending these rights through 
repealable statutes. Some o f  these elaborations are legitimate, particularly those concerning 
property rights.^^ But m ost o f  them  are not, mistakenly taking the rights we com m only 
acknowledge as desirable for natural persons and bestowing them  to the property natural 
persons possess. A very partial list includes status as legal persons. Fourteenth A m endm ent 
equal protection o f  the laws. First A m endm ent protection for corporate political speech"*  ̂and
Property rights’ refer to the rights that people have in their possession o f property. They 
are n o t the rights that are accorded to property, though that ironic interpretation is what I in 
fact argue occurs when the Supreme C ourt extends rights to the corporate form.
First N a t’l Bank o f Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765. M oney was made the 
equivalent o f  speech, and thus corporate spending on political referenda cannot be restricted.
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com m ercial speech,^'* Fourth A m endm ent protection from unreasonable searches for 
corporate docum ents/^ and from regulatory searches w ithout a court warrant, etc/*" And 
though this article focuses on free speech rights I am not claiming that corporate claims to 
free speech rights are more problem atic than the other claimed rights, but rather I focus on 
free speech because it is a moral right and thus o f particular interest here. T hat said, 
corporate claims o f free speech rights are a cause for concern, as is the blurring o f the 
boundary between commercial and political speech in particular. As noted above, political 
speech enjoys greater U.S. Constitutional protections than does commercial speech. 
Corporations, no t surprisingly, often seek these greater protections by claiming commercial 
speech is actually political speech.
A recent example o f this is docum ented in the 2002 decision by the Supreme Court 
o f  California, Kasky v. N ike, Inc.^̂  There the Supreme C ourt o f  California overturned a 
lower court’s decision that N ike, Inc., had engaged in political speech when it made 
fraudulent claims in corporate com m unication about the labor practices and working
Central H udson Gas Elec. Corp. v. Public Utilities C om m ’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557.
H ale V . H enkel (1906) 201 U.S. 43-
M arshall v. Barlow’s Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307.
T he examples cited in this sentence are taken from Mayer, Carl J. (1990) ‘Personalizing 
the Impersonal : Corporations and the Bill o f  Rights’, The Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 41 No. 
13. p. 580, pp. 664-667. This list is quite extensive, and each item  on the list deserves 
analysis similar to that given by this article to corporate speech rights. T he best compact 
history o f this may be found in M ayer and in the very recently published ‘M odel A m id  
Curiae Brief to Eliminate Corporate Rights’, by Richard L. Grossman, Thom as Alan Linzey, 
and Daniel E. Brannen, available at http://w w w .poclad.org and 
http://vvww.ratical.org/corporations/dem oBrief.htm l.
Kasky V . Nike, Inc. (2002) 45 P.3d 243 (Supreme C ourt o f  California)48
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conditions where its products were made. Bluntly, N ike claimed that it was allowed to lie to 
the public because it was advancing the public debate on an issue o f public concern and thus 
engaged in political speech. However, the state Supreme C ourt properly saw it for what it 
was, commercial inform ation made by a commercial entity in order to achieve commercial 
ends, and thus Nike, Inc. could be pursued by the state o f California for violations o f its state 
consum er fraud laws.^^
Lastly, and before we delve into the desired normative outcom e for these speech 
rights conflicts, one more corporate speech example is w orth noting. The M onsanto 
C om pany recently engaged in activities o f disinform ation on an area o f great public concern. 
E ither directly or through its public relations firms, the M onsanto C om pany has operated a 
covert public relations campaign that invents internet personalities — fictitious persons who 
disclaim association w ith the com pany — to participate in internet discussions groups 
regarding genetically engineered food, advance positions supportive o f the company, and 
attack the com pany’s critics.^”
O n  an appeal request by the N ike corporation, the U.S. Supreme C ourt heard this case 
during its spring 2003 session, and then decided to dismiss it. N ike subsequently settled 
w ith the plain tiff rather than go to trial in California. For broad details on this case the 
reader is directed to http://www.recIaim dem ocracy.org.
“At the end o f  last year. Jay Byrne, formerly the com pany’s director o f internet outreach, 
explained to a num ber o f  other firms the tactics he had used at M onsanto. H e showed how, 
before he got to work, the top C M  sites listed by an internet search engine were all critical o f 
the technology. Following his intervention, the top sites were all supportive ones (four o f 
them  established by M onsanto’s PR firm Bivings)” (M onbiot, George (2002) ‘T he Covert 
Biotech W ar : T he Battle to Put a Corporate C m  Padlock on O u r Foodchain Is Being 
Fought on  the N et’, The Guardian 19 Novem ber). This is an especially troubling tactic now 
that m ajor internet search engines allow sites to pay for better position in search results. An
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Both o f  these examples suggest that corporate managers will seek whatever 
advantages they can get. In the arena o f law one o f  these advantages has been the acquisition 
o f  m oral rights by the corporate form. A nd this acquisition, as I have noted, makes 
inevitable that the moral rights o f  persons will collide with the moral rights claimed by 
corporations, these legal fictions. These examples all reflect efforts by corporations to 
influence public policy, ostensibly the dom ain o f natural persons and their governments.
U nderneath all this is the question o f who should be allowed to participate in the 
establishm ent o f public policy. In a democracy we expect public policy to be set by its 
members, w hom  we normally consider to be the citizens. Citizenship, at least in the U.S., 
remains reserved exclusively for natural persons. I assert that im plem entations o f democracy 
at a m in im um  should: distribute rather than consolidate power, recognizing the inherent 
value that those who m ust subm it to laws should somehow be empowered to establish them; 
seek ways to prevent concentrations o f  private power from overwhelming public power, 
preserving the demos o f  democracy; and prevent concentrations o f  private power from 
infringing upon the rights and liberties o f  the m ost vulnerable members o f society, specifically 
in ways which the government is forbidden to do?^
entity  w ith m oney can buy the top spots, providing another tool whereby money can be 
converted into public — and ultimately political — influence.
This is critically different from the current im plem entation o f American democracy. It is 
illegal, for example, for the U.S. governm ent to practice discrim ination based on race or 
religion or, to some degree, on gender. However, it is legal for individual persons to 
discrim inate based on these. Because o f this distinction U.S. federal laws prohibiting racial 
discrim ination and segregation in public accom m odations (e.g., hotels and restaurants) have 
to be justified on economic — not moral — grounds. Simply, racial discrim ination and 
segregation unlawfully interfere w ith interstate commerce.
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Economic power deserves special attention. It is a power for coercion. It is rational 
that a governm ent seeking to protect democracy would seek to limit the power o f wealth, 
and theoretically that can be done w ithout restricting the possession o f wealth, distinguishing 
between those rights and liberties accorded a person, and those accorded their money. 
Corporations are “mechanisms by means o f which a num ber o f persons unite for the purpose 
o f assembling a fund o f capital w ith which to carry on some business enterprises.”^' They 
are, by definition, a concentration o f  wealth. Being creations o f the state, and created 
specifically to engage in activities to exercise economic power, the corporate form is a proper 
object o f  democratic concern and state control.
In  light o f  this, and assuming that a democratic government should work to achieve 
the dem ocratic ideals defined above, these conflicts o f  moral rights between natural persons 
and corporations normatively should resolve with the rights accorded to natural persons as 
pre-em inent over the rights — if any — accorded to corporate persons. Further, I argue that 
the best normative arrangem ent would require governments to grant legal powers and 
protections to corporate entities only as privileges, and not as rights. The difference is that a 
right may be inalienable and irrevocable, but privileges persist only at the pleasure o f the
”  D odd p. 367.
W hile today it is com m only accepted that corporations are private, they originated as 
public institutions; it was the people’s governm ent that granted corporate charters. Some 
present-day democracy activists invoke the vestigial rem nants o f this public origin and 
prom ote its reconsideration. Indeed such a change o f perception would make it m uch easier 
to revoke privileges and (re)institute public authority upon business corporations.
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grantor. T he democratic ideal, above, strongly suggests that rights — particularly moral 
rights — be reserved exclusively for natural persons.^'*
V I. R eso lv in g  the C onflict T hrou gh  Secondary M oral A gen cy
In  her book. Persons, Rights, d f Corporations, Patricia W erhane proposes that 
corporations be classified as “secondary moral agents,” and therefore objects o f blame and 
praise to be held responsible for their actions, and with claim to secondary moral rights.
This proposal is built from a “theory o f secondary action” as applied to the corporate form.
Secondary actions arise from a delegation o f responsibility. If I delegate a general 
responsibility to another person, and this person determines and executes specific actions in 
fulfillm ent o f  this responsibility, then these actions are secondary actions. I remain the 
prim ary agent, but only for the act o f  d e le g a t io n .T h e  person determ ining and executing 
the secondary actions is the secondary agent. Similarly, W erhane sees corporate actions as 
secondary actions. Shareholders delegate to corporate boards general responsibilities, 
providing only general instructions (described in corporate charters and by shareholder 
initiatives). Thus, corporate founders and shareholders are primary agents o f the delegation,
This second part o f  the desired arrangem ent receives m ore support by the reasoning set 
forth in “VII. Resolving the Conflict through Artificial Entity Theory,” below.
W erhane, Patricia H. (1985) Persons, Rights, &  Corporations, Englewood Cliffs C O , 
Prentice-Hall, p. 58.
W erhane pp. 52-56.
It is assumed that I provide only general instructions to the secondary agent. If, on the 
other hand, I provide instructions containing specific actions to be carried out, then I am the 
prim ary agent for those actions. M y responsibility isn’t absolved or reduced merely by 
telling someone else to carry them  out.
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and the corporate board and managers are secondary agents carrying out “collective 
secondary actions.” ®̂
T here is some distance, however, from determ ining that corporate employees 
com m it collective secondary actions, to the point where moral agency may be ascribed to the 
corporate form. M oral agency requires the intentional application o f reason. A t first glance, 
ascribing moral agency to the corporate form, that is, “ascrib[ing] to such artificial entities an 
‘intellect’ or ‘m ind’ for freedom o f conscience purposes is to confuse m etaphor with 
reality.” ®̂ A corporation is not a living physical entity as is a natural person. Corporate 
actions, however, do take place in a physical world, and their tangible im pact suggests the 
corporate form  is due recognition as an ontological individual.’® These actions are 
determ ined by other persons (e.g., corporate managers) in compliance w ith general 
instructions from  its shareholders com m unicated through the board o f directors. “ [T]he 
‘actions’ o f  a corporation are no t literally actions o f a physical entity, but rather, ‘actions’ that 
are represented and carried ou t through persons, ” persons acting w ith intentionality and 
reason in the fulfillment o f their corporate duties.*’’ W erhane calls the arrangement 
“methodological collectivism.”^̂  Thus, she argues, a corporation meets the requirements o f
W erhane p. 55.
Pacific Gas &C Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Com m ission, (1986) 475 U.S. 1, p. 33 (Justice 
R ehnquist, dissenting).
Corporations retain and direct the actions o f employees and consultants, have lawyers 
execute contracts and initiate legal actions, cause the construction o f factories and the 
production and dispersal o f both products and waste.
W erhane pp. 50-51.
W erhane p. 51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ritz - 24
moral agency: it is an ontological individual who through methodological collectivism acts 
w ith  reason and intentionality. But because corporations “lack the autonom y necessary to 
perform  prim ary actions” they cannot be primary moral agents, only secondary ones.*^^
W erhane alludes to a num ber o f consequential effects o f  her theory. For example, 
corporations could no longer claim to be neutral or silent with regard to moral demands, and 
corporate managers in particular would not be excused from secondary moral responsibility. 
After all, moral rights cannot be detached from moral responsibilities. Finally, W erhane 
alludes to a critically im portant idea also made explicit in her book: secondary moral agency 
is sufficient to justify moral claim to rights, she reasons, but these should be considered 
“secondary moral rights”; natural persons, on the other hand, have “primary moral rights” 
arising from  their prim ary moral agency. Thus conflicting claims o f rights between 
corporations and natural persons m ust always recognize the superior claims o f natural
64persons.
W ith  regard to International D airy, the court saw this as a conflict o f equal claim to 
the same right. W hen faced w ith such a situation U.S. courts first preferentially act to 
protect rights, then if no such protection is required, the court may seek to advance them. 
T he court did follow that recipe in this case, protecting corporate free speech rights, and thus 
not advancing hum an free speech rights. Ascribing the inferior status o f secondary moral
63
64
W erhane p. 57.
W hat W erhane describes regarding the delegation o f responsibilities largely is already 
covered in the agency law o f business as determ ined by the laws o f U.S. states. Agency law, 
however, does not grapple w ith the issue o f corporate moral agency, and thus is silent on the 
issue o f secondary versus primary rights.
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rights to corporations should have resulted in a judicial conclusion advancing the rights o f 
natural persons rather than protecting the secondary rights claimed by corporations.
Classifying corporate rights as secondary has two broad practical effects. T he first is 
that corporations may exercise their rights, but only when such exercise does not infringe 
upon hum an rights. Second, it would legalize the prom otion o f hum an rights at the expense 
o f the rights claimed by corporation. And while this arrangement would be o f tremendous 
assistance to those seeking to exercise hum an rights as a means for protecting hum ans from 
corporate harms, secondary moral agency still extends to corporations Constitutional 
protections from government infringement, at least for purposes other than the protection o f 
the rights o f  natural persons.*"^ So while this theory coherently provides for the normative 
outcom e desired w ith regard to International Dairy, it would not justify a law which, for 
example, simply outlawed corporations from ‘speaking’ (i.e., spending money) upon political 
referenda; such a law would unconstitutionally infringe upon corporate free speech rights 
because it lacks a collision w ith the rights o f natural persons. W erhane’s assertion o f the 
corporation as an ontological individual, unfortunately, still largely maintains the political 
power o f corporations, and thus it fails to support the second part o f the desired normative 
arrangem ent.
Surprise inspections to confirm  worker health and safety or for building safety are not 
allowed because U.S. corporations have protection from surprise regulatory searches w ithout 
a court order.
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V IL R esolv ing the C onflict through A rtificial E ntity  T h eory
The ‘artificial entity theory’ o f the corporate form provides a significant contrast to
W erhane’s ideas for secondary moral agency, and it satisfies both the first and second parts of 
the norm ative outcome desired w ith regard to International Dairy. Here it is useful to recall 
some additional early history o f the corporate form. The earliest recorded corporations were 
peace guilds and craft g u i ld s .P e a c e  guilds provided for mutual protection; they later 
evolved into the idea o f municipal corporations. M embership in a peace guild was 
determ ined by geographic proximity, that is, residency within a delineated territory. Both 
peace and craft guilds exercised some authority over their members, including the ability to 
levy taxes or other responsibilities upon its members. But their most im portant feature was 
in providing for the practical needs o f societies o f persons, particularly that these societies 
receive state recognition in order to hold property in com m on and be able to incur 
obligations in common.*’̂  These associations were artificial entities, creatures o f the state, 
w ith the prim ary purpose o f holding property and contractual obligations in com m on — a 
very practical, tangible need o f societies o f persons. As creatures o f the state an association’s 
powers were only those directly conferred upon it by the state. This arrangement thus argues 
against vaovA rights for corporations'^® and justifies the granting to them of privileges — not
^  W illiston, Samuel (1888) ‘T he H istory o f the Law o f Business Corporations before 1800’, 
H arvard Law  Review, Vol. 2 N o. 3, p. 108.
W illiston p. 107.
M ayer p. 582.
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rights "  particularly those privileges that enable their primary purpose of holding property 
and obligations in common for an association of persons.
This contrasts with 'natural entity theory,’ which is a theory asserting that a 
corporation possesses a corporate personality. There are two bases for this concept of 
corporate personality. The first views the corporation as an entity independent of its owners 
(i.e., shareholders), a basis compatible with Werhane’s ideas of methodological collectivism, 
ontological individualism, and the grant of secondary moral rights. In retrospect we may 
now see that Werhane built her theory of secondary moral agency upon a foundation of 
natural entity theory. She saw the corporation as a secondary moral agent of the 
shareholders, granted both moral rights and moral responsibilities. The second basis 
establishes corporate personality by viewing it as closely associated with its owners. This 
conception does not separate the rights accorded a person with the rights accorded their 
property. It was this conception that appears to have been used to rationalize the first 
significant and enabling grant of U.S. Constitutional rights to the corporate form.^^ The 
right in question was the equal protection of the laws as enumerated in the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.™ Legal historian Morton J. Horwitz writes that 
“the central argument was that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the property rights not
We shall never know with certainty the rationale behind this momentous change in U.S. 
Constitutional doctrine, as it was made without the provision of written opinion, and 
without even the argument of counsel (Horwitz, Morton J. (1992) The Transformation o f 
American Law, 1870-1960 : The Crisis o f Legal Orthodoxy, New York NY, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 66-67).
™ The relevant portion of the Amendment reads: “... nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
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of some abstract corporate entity but rather of the individual [human] shareholders.” '̂ And 
so to deny these rights of a corporation necessarily meant to deny them of its human 
shareholders. To prevent such ‘injustice’ it was necessary to see corporations as included 
within the definition of “persons ” for the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (thereby preventing states from treating corporate property differently from the 
personal property of its shareholders). This established corporate personality, and enabled 
the rights accorded to natural persons to permeate the corporate veil and link to the 
corporate form. A legal fiction created by the law now possessed rights against the law, but 
without a physical body, and without the capacities necessary for moral reasoning.^^
Once we accept that moral rights for natural persons exist outside the law, we may be 
tempted to inquire as to their origin. I assert that it does not matter if they come from God 
or reason. All that matters is that these rights exist even without governments or other 
institutionalized human associations. They must, for otherwise, as Dworkin has observed, 
natural persons would have no moral rights at all. Thus if we natural persons have moral 
rights, then these are rights against both the government and against associations of persons
Horwitz p. 69. At the time of this decision all states still prohibited corporations from 
owning stock in other corporations, making it easier to connect corporations to the human 
rights of its direct owners.
Corporations, given ‘life’, have now turned against their creator. Some writers on this 
subject analogize this to Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein; see Gabaldon, Theresa A. (1992) The 
Lemonade Stand : Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate 
Shareholders’, Vanderbilt Law ReviewYoX. 45, ŸŸ- 1390-1394. However such analogies are 
apt only to the extent that the creation turns against its creator, as Shelly’s Frankenstein is 
not driven by the profit motive, and clearly possesses primary moral agency through the 
intentional application of reason to determine his actions.
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in whatever form they take — including the corporate form. Even Thom as Hobbes, a 
philosopher w ith a dismal view o f hum an nature, argues that natural persons possess some 
natural rights.^^
G ranting rights to an association o f persons is equivalent to putting them  into 
potential conflict w ith the rights o f  individual natural persons. This may be acceptable for 
non-m oral rights. Indeed, the social contract whereby societies are formalized involves this 
very relinquishm ent o f some non-moral rights, and the vesting o f special rights in a sovereign 
in exchange for other tangible benefits o f social cooperation. But, as noted above, taking 
rights seriously means that moral rights not only should not — but cannot — be given away.
If, as I have claimed, it is immoral to allow a governm ent to infringe upon moral rights, then 
reasoning by analogy, it is just as immoral to have a corporation infringe upon them . Thus 
the grant o f moral rights to corporations is immoral and thus unethical.
This second approach o f artificial entity theory supports both parts o f  the desired 
norm ative arrangement; first, that the rights o f natural persons are pre-em inent over any 
powers or protections granted to the corporate form; and second, that the powers and 
protections granted to the corporate form be classified as privileges, not as rights at all.
“T he R ight O f  Nature, which W riters com m only call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty o f each 
m an hath , to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation o f his own Nature; 
that is to say, o f  his own life [ .. .] .” Hobbes, Thom as (1997) Leviathan, New York NY, 
N orton  &  Co., p. 72.
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V IIL  C onclu sion
T he obvious implication upon com m unication ethics is that corporate speech could 
be made subject to legal standards for ethical com m unication practices that are higher than 
now  allowed. For example, a content-neutral approach to corporate speech would be to 
lim it their use o f wealth to a certain ratio o f that which the public is able and willing to 
spend ‘speaking’ on a matter. Such changes are not restrictions o f the rights o f  natural 
persons to speak freely, but rather distinguish the rights accorded natural persons from the 
privileges granted to their property (corporations and corporate wealth being mere 
p r o p e r t y ) . T h e  poin t is the loudest voices regarding matters o f public concern should be 
the natural persons in their capacity as self-governing hum an beings. These voices include 
those natural persons directing the wealth o f corporations, but vocalized only in their civic 
capacity — not their business capacity, and certainly not wielding the corporations they direct 
as weapons upon the body politic.
Rather than asking corporations to voluntarily raise their ethical com m unication 
standards — to not lie so much, to not use their wealth to influence public policy — ethical 
com m unication practices could instead receive legal force equal to those granted to ethical 
accounting practices now placed upon corporations under the rule o f law. The moral right 
o f  free speech is an essential ingredient for democracy. The return o f this moral right for
This article avoids the complicated subject o f determ ining where the boundary should exist 
between matters o f business interest and those o f public interest. Instead, this article is 
m eant to encourage creating this to-be-determ ined boundary and justify that the rights o f 
free speech be reserved exclusively for natural persons, with corporations receiving only 
contingent speech privileges.
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exclusive use by natural persons is not just important to those who wish to advance ethics in 
communications, it is important for advancing global justice.
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